Chapter Text
The public reaction to Sputnik was varied. The dominance of the United States in multiple fields had been equaled,if not surpassed,by Soviet engineering. The launch proved that the Soviets had rockets capable of sending nuclear weapons from Russia to Western Europe and even North America. This was the most immediate threat that the launch of Sputnik posed. The United States, a land with a history of geographical security from European wars, suddenly seemed vulnerable.
A contributing factor to the Sputnik Crisis was that the Soviets had not released a photograph of the satellite for five days after the launch. Until this point, its appearance remained a mystery to Americans. Another factor was Sputnik's weight of 184 pounds,compared to United States' plans to launch a satellite of 21.5 pounds.The Soviet claim seemed outrageous to many American officials who doubted its accuracy. U.S. rockets at the time produced 150,000 pounds of thrust and U.S. officials presumed that the Soviet rocket that launched Sputnik into space had to have produced 200,000 pounds-force of thrust. In fact, the R-7 rocket that launched Sputnik 1 into space produced almost 1,000,000 pounds of thrust. All these factors contributed to the American people's perception that they were greatly behind the Soviets in the development of space technologies.
Hours after the launch, the Cornell Department of Physics rigged an ad-hoc interferometer to measure signals from the satellite. Don Gilman and Jim Snyder programmed the ILLIAC computer to calculate the satellite orbit from this data. The programming and calculation was completed in less than two days. The rapid publication of the orbit’s properties in the journal Nature within a month of the satellite launch helped to dispel some of the fear created by the Sputnik launch. It also lent credence to the idea that the Sputnik launch was part of an organized Soviet effort to dominate space.
Five days after the launch of Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite, Eisenhower addressed the people of the United States. After being asked by a reporter about security concerns regarding the Russian satellite, Eisenhower said "Now, so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota".
Eisenhower made the argument that Sputnik was only a scientific achievement and not a military threat or change in world power. Eisenhower believed that Sputnik's weight "was not commensurate with anything of great military significance, and that was also a factor in putting it in proper perspective".
In February 1959 Eisenhower declared three "stark facts" the United States needed to confront:
- The USSR had surpassed the United States and "the rest of the free world" in scientific and technological advancements in outer space.
- If the USSR maintained this superiority, it might use it as a means to undermine the United States' prestige and leadership.
- If the USSR became the first to achieve significantly superior military capability in outer space and create an imbalance of power, it could pose a direct military threat to the United States.
He followed this statement by saying that the United States needed to meet these challenges with "resourcefulness and vigor". Eisenhower's ability to project confidence about the situation was limited because his confidence was based on aerial reconnaissance. As such, he failed to quell the fears that there was a shift in power between the Americans and Soviets. The perception of the Soviets as more modern than Americans was reinforced by Eisenhower's old-fashioned style. The launch of Sputnik 1 also impacted Eisenhower's ratings in his polls, from which he eventually recovered.
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On October 23, 1957, the United States Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Vanguard program successfully tested a three-stage rocket designed to send an American Earth satellite into orbit. The recent launch of the Soviet Union’s rocket bearing the first Earth satellite, Sputnik 1, created a sense of urgency for the U.S. to catch up with their Cold War nemesis, and the original timetable for American satellite deployment was put on a fast track.
In 1955, the United States government announced plans to create and successfully place an Earth satellite into orbit during the International Geophysical Year, running from July, 1957 through December of 1958. Consequently, three branches of the armed services – the Army, Air Force, and Navy – all independently pursued their own rocket-development programs. The Army’s Redstone project and the Air Force’s Atlas ballistic missiles were military in nature and of a top priority. The NRL was always viewed more as a scientific organization and Vanguard was emphasized as a non-military project.
Two NRL program launches took place before October 23rd’s blast-off. TV-0, launched December 8, 1956, tested telemetry systems, and TV-1 on May 1, 1957, tested the separation and subsequent second-stage ignition capabilities of the two-stage rocket design. Several abortive attempts occurred over the summer of 1957, before TV-2 was able to test the 75 feet tall, 3.74 foot diameter, 22,156 pound, three-stage version. TV-2 successfully demonstrated Vanguard’s ability for first-second stage separation and “spin-up” of the third stage. Stages 1 and 2 were steered by gimbaled engines. The third stage was “spin-stabilized, the spin being imparted by a turn-table on the second stage before separation”. The engines worked, the turn-table worked, the telemetry and separation systems worked, but American rockets were still incapable of packing a satellite aboard.
The next test reservation date for Cape Canaveral’s LC-18A pad would be December 6,1957.